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THE INCONSISTENT INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF
ADULT ADOPTEES AND A PROPOSAL FOR
UNIFORMITY
As summarized by the comparison of laws in Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana, and Minnesota, the inheritance rights of adult adoptees vary
across jurisdictions. The inheritance rights of an adult adoptee will
depend on the status of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in the
jurisdiction, the age limitations for inheritance in the jurisdiction, and
whether there is any language granting or restricting inheritance rights in
the testamentary documents. The majority of the time, the goal of the
adoption is to make the person a genuine member of the family. As it
stands, states do not uniformly treat adult adoptees as genuine members
of the family. A default rule that uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s
inheritance rights is generally in line with the adoptor’s motivation for the
adoption. Three proposals may help to remedy the inconsistent adoption
rights across jurisdictions: First, “family” should be defined by looking at
the functional role each member plays, as opposed to using marital status
to define “family” and to determine the benefits that accompany that
status through marriage. Second, allowing a person to designate his or
her heir is a partial solution for partners that are prevented from adopting
or for partners who are discouraged from adopting by the awkward
parent–child relationship that would result from the adoption. Third, a
uniform law that gives an adult adoptee the status of a natural child of the
adoptor, without any age limits, would ensure the equal treatment of adult
adoptees across the country.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the areas of trust and will interpretation, states vary on how to
interpret class gifts that include language such as “issue,” “heirs,” and
“children.” This variance is one motivation for people to undertake
drastic measures such as adult adoption. For example, Father and
Mother set up a trust to benefit their children, X, Y, & Z. Z dislikes his
siblings but has no spouse or children. Z wants to make sure his share of
his parents’ trust does not go to his siblings. Z adopts a good friend of
his, T, who is an adult. Jurisdictions vary on how to interpret T’s
interest and vary on T’s ability to benefit from Z’s parents’ trust. Some
statutes only restrict an adult adoptee’s ability to inherit from a third
party when the testamentary documents specifically prohibit such
inheritance. Other statutes set a strict age limit, disallowing an adult
adoptee to inherit from a third party when they are adopted after age
eighteen. Although the example illustrates one motivation for adult
adoption, most times an adoption is a result of a close and loving
relationship. The goal of the adoption is to make the person a genuine
member of the family. As it stands, states do not uniformly treat adult
adoptees as genuine members of the family. A default rule that
uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights generally aligns
with the adoptor’s motivation for the adoption.
There are several different theories on how to remedy this
inconsistency. One solution would change the current definition and
meaning of “family” in the law. The so-called “functional” approach
attempts to define the familial relationship by actually looking at the
nature of the relationship between parties. Another solution would
allow people to designate a beneficiary at law, eliminating the need to
turn to drastic measures, such as adult adoption. A third solution would
be to pass a uniform law giving an adult adoptee the status of a natural
child. Uniformity would help to fulfill the goal of undertaking the
adoption in the first place—to take in the person as a genuine member
of the family.
In this Comment, Part II will discuss the history of adoption and give
a background on how adult adoption differs from “regular” adoption.
Part III will discuss the different motivations parties would have for
adult adoption, ranging from inclusion in a class gift to denying standing
to collateral relatives who seek to challenge a testamentary disposition.
Part IV compares the current inheritance rights of adult adoptees in
Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota. Part V outlines solutions
and proposals for solving the inconsistency of adult adoptees’
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inheritance rights across jurisdictions. Finally, Part VI concludes with a
summary of the main issues and the proposals to remedy those issues.
II. HISTORY OF ADOPTION
The progression of the laws of succession and adoption is important
to understanding the slow changes and unsure outcomes in inheritance
law as applied to adoptees today. Adoption was not recognized at
common law; the process of formal adoption is a product of statutory
law. 1 At common law, succession was based on blood relationships. 2 As
a result of this preference for blood relationships, historically there was
strong resistance to the idea that anyone outside a direct blood
3
relationship would inherit family property. This resistance started to
change in the mid-nineteenth century when the first adoption statutes
helped to legitimize the idea of adoption, allowing families to codify
4
“parent–child” relationships. The first statutes, however, disfavored
adoptees and barred them from inheriting from third-party donors
5
under the “stranger-to-the-adoption rule.” In contrast, statutes today
treat adopted children as “full-fledged” members of the adoptive
6
family. Today, adoption statutes seek to promote the best interests of
the child, a goal accomplished by totally transplanting the child into the
7
new family with a “fresh start.”
Even though modern adoption statutes attempt to transplant a
minor adoptee into the new family, many statutes leave unanswered
1. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on
Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984). Rein’s 1984 article
has been highly influential and frequently cited within the field. See E. Gary Spitko, Open
Adoption, Inheritance, and the “Uncleing” Principle, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 780 n.54
(2008) (stating that Rein’s was an “important article on inheritance rights arising from
adoption”). As of February 13, 2012, Westlaw had 108 references that cite to Rein’s article,
including sixteen cases.
2. Rein, supra note 1, at 713.
3. Id.
4. Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 93, 148 (1996); Rein, supra note 1, at 714–15 (explaining that the first adoption
statutes were part of a large “wave of social welfare reform”).
5. Spitko, supra note 1, at 771 (quoting Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real
Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1128 (2003)). The stranger-to-the-adoption rule creates a
presumption that an adoptee is not within a class gift when the donor is not also the adoptor.
Rein, supra note 1, at 733.
6. Spitko, supra note 1, at 772.
7. Kelly v. Iverson (In re Estates of Donnelly), 502 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash. 1972);
Rein, supra note 1, at 713, 719.
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questions regarding succession rights of the adoptee, the adopting
8
Professor Jan Rein
family, and the adoptee’s genetic family.
enumerates topics that an ideal statute would cover concerning
succession rights in an adoption:
(1) Can the adoptee and the adoptor inherit from each other?
(2) Can the adoptee inherit through the adoptor from the
adoptor’s kindred? (3) Can the adoptor’s kindred inherit from
and through the adoptee? (4) Should the adoptee’s former
ability to inherit from his biological parents and their kindred be
retained or abolished? (5) Should the former ability of the
biological parents and their kindred to inherit from the adoptee
be retained or abolished? (6) Should any of these questions be
answered differently in relative adoption cases when the adoptor
is either a stepparent or a blood relative of the adoptee? . . .
(8) Should these questions be answered differently with respect
to inheritance by, from, and through a person who is adopted as
9
an adult?
Even if the relevant statute adequately covers an adoptee’s inheritance
rights, a donative document may alter the rights of adoptees.
To determine if an adoptee inherits under a donative document, the
adoption statute may become relevant to aid in the court’s
10
interpretation. To interpret a donative document, the court first looks
at the donor’s intent, which is the “controlling consideration in
11
If there are
determining the meaning of the donative document.”
ambiguities or gaps, the court looks at the statute:
[T]he court must find the donor’s intent somehow and does so
by indulging in a presumption as to what the average donor
using the language he used must have intended. Here is where
the adoption statutes and the statutes of descent and distribution
8. Rein, supra note 1, at 712.
9. Id. at 718.
10. See McKee v. McDonald (In re Estate of McDonald), 20 Wis. 2d 63, 67, 121 N.W.2d
245, 248 (1963) (“Existing statutory and case law is one of the extrinsic aids which may be
consulted in resolving a will ambiguity by construction. The reason for this is that testator is
presumed to know the law—both statutory and case law. Where applicable law is to be
looked to as a surrounding circumstance, it is the law in effect at the time of making the will.”
(internal citations omitted)).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 (2003).
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come in by the back door. Most courts now view these statutes
as reflective of community attitudes toward adoptees and thus,
by inference, reflective of the attitude of the particular donor as
12
a member of the community.
This process of interpreting a donative document and using the
13
statutes to fill gaps is apparent in the interpretation of class gifts. An
example of a class gift would be a disposition in a will giving money or
14
property “to my nieces and nephews to share equally.” A donor may
never consider whether a class gift should include an adoptee, creating
15
the possibility that the court will use the statute as a gap-filler.
When a court must decide the inheritance rights of adoptees, several
factors come into play, including the donor–donee relationship and the
16
laws in force at the time the donative document was executed. First,
courts distinguish between instruments executed by the adoptor and
17
instruments executed by someone other than the adoptor. When the
18
adoptor is the donor, a class gift will include the adoptee. This concept
is consistent with the goal of adoption statutes—a total transplantation
19
of the adoptee into the adoptor’s family. However, when the donor is
someone other than the adoptor, for instance where a grandparent gives
a gift “to my grandchildren” and there is a grandchild adopted as an
adult, courts have had a harder time deciding whether adoptees are
20
included in a class gift.
In addition to the relationship between parties, courts may also
consider the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine, which creates a
12. Rein, supra note 1, at 732; see also In re Estate of McDonald, 20 Wis. 2d at 67, 121
N.W.2d at 248 (explaining that the court may consult the statutes as an extrinsic aid in
resolving a will ambiguity).
13. ”A class gift is a disposition to beneficiaries who are described by a group label and
are intended to take as a group.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004).
14. See, e.g., Stratton v. Rollings (In re Estate of Phillips), 236 Wis. 268, 272, 294 N.W.
824, 825 (1940) (devising “to my nieces and nephews . . . the sum of $8,000 to be divided
between them share and share alike and to their heirs and assigns forever”).
15. Rein, supra note 1, at 732.
16. Id. at 733, 737.
17. Id. at 733.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 719; Spitko, supra note 1, at 772.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21–28 (explaining that whether the adoptee is
entitled to inherit from a third party depends on whether the jurisdiction has repealed the
stranger-to-the-adoption rule and whether the new rule is applied retroactively).

18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

INCONSISTENT INHERITANCE RIGHTS

6/22/2012 9:58 PM

1049

presumption that an adoptee is not within a class gift when the donor is
21
not also the adoptor. To rebut the presumption, the party seeking to
include the adoptee within a class gift must prove that the donor was
22
aware of the adoptee at the time of the instrument’s execution.
Recently however, courts have overwhelmingly overturned the strangerto-the-adoption presumption, giving way to a more inclusive policy
23
toward adoptees. In a case on point, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
stated that “[w]e cannot believe it probable that strangers to the
adoption would differentiate between the natural child and the adopted
child of another. . . . We ought not impute to others instincts contrary to
24
our own.” Courts no longer automatically exclude adoptees from a
class gift executed by a third party; however, there can be restrictions
25
upon the gift. For example, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) suggests
that if the transferor is not the adoptive parent, an adoptee will not take
in a class gift unless: “(1) the adoption took place before the adoptee
reached [18] years of age; (2) the adoptive parent was the adoptee’s
stepparent or foster parent; or (3) the adoptive parent functioned as a
26
parent of the adoptee before the adoptee reached [18] years of age.”
21. Rein, supra note 1, at 733; see also Warren v. Prescott, 24 A. 946, 949 (Me. 1892)
(stating that “[b]y adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot
thus make one for their kindred”); Knoeller v. Uihlein (In re Estate of Uihlein), 269 Wis. 170,
176, 68 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1955) (“The status resulting from adoption proceedings is not a
natural one. It is a civil or contractual status. One may have the right to assume the status of
a father to a stranger of the blood, but he has no moral right to impose upon his brother the
status of an uncle to his adopted son.” (quoting Bradley v. Tweedy (In re Estate of Bradley),
185 Wis. 393, 396–97, 201 N.W. 973, 974 (1925))).
22. Rein, supra note 1, at 733–34.
23. Id. at 735.
24. In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571, 575 (N.J. 1964); see also Smith v. Reinhart (In re
Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 262, 140 N.W.2d 219, 225 (1966) (“This theory [of the
importance of blood relationships] is completely contrary to the present attitude of the family
and of the public toward adoption. The tendency, desire, and public policy in every adoption
is to completely absorb an adopted child into a family unit and to make his status in fact
indistinguishable from that of a natural child, not only in his relationship with his adoptive
parents, but, also, with the general public and with relatives who are not immediate members
of the family circle.”).
25. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (2004) (amended 2008).
26. Id. § 2-705(f). The brackets around the eighteen signify that the developers of the
UPC do not believe there will be uniformity on the specific age. Thus, states may allow
adoptees to take under the will if they were raised in the adoptor’s house from an earlier age.
For example, in Wisconsin, the adoptee can take as a member of a class if the “[t]he adoptive
parent raised the adopted person in a parent-like relationship beginning on or before the
child’s 15th birthday and lasting for a substantial period or until adulthood.” WIS. STAT.
§ 854.20 (2009–2010).
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In addition to the stranger-to-the-adoption rule, courts may take into
consideration the adoption laws that were in force at the time the
27
This factor becomes especially significant
document was executed.
when the court’s interpretation of the instrument occurs many years
28
For instance, imagine a situation where the
after its execution.
instrument was created when the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine was
in full force, but the interpretation happens today, when the doctrine
29
Courts have been inconsistent on
has been mostly overturned.
30
whether to apply the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine retroactively.
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that
“[w]e generally apply the law at the time of death, with the
understanding that testators have kept abreast of the changes in the law
and would make appropriate revisions in their instruments if these
31
changes contravened their original expectations.” In contrast, Indiana
abrogated the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in 2003 and included a
provision that allows courts to apply the new rule retroactively, meaning
that adoptees would inherit from a third party even if the testamentary
document was executed while the stranger-to-the-adoption rule was
32
In Paloutzian v. Taggart, the Indiana Court of Appeals
effective.
applied the new statute to create a rebuttable presumption that the
donor intended to include her adopted grandchild when the trust stated
it would benefit the “children” of her son if he did not survive the
33
donor.
Faced with similar circumstances, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to retroactively apply the
34
One
statute that overturned the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.
reason that courts refuse to apply the new presumption to previously
executed instruments is because of the “assumption that the average
American citizen of fifty or eighty years ago would not have wished non35
blood related adoptive family members to partake of his bounty.”
27. Rein, supra note 1, at 737. Rein terms this factor “the retroactivity problem.” Id.
28. See, e.g., Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(interpreting a document in 2010 that was executed in 1953).
29. See, e.g., id. at 923–24.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 31–32 (noting that two jurisdictions are different
on whether to retroactively apply an inclusive presumption toward adoptees).
31. Callan v. Winters, 534 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Mass. 1989).
32. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-1-4 (LexisNexis 2011).
33. 931 N.E.2d at 929.
34. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35. Rein, supra note 1, at 738.
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However, authorities have questioned the validity of this assumption.36
For example, the court in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes
discussed the retroactive inclusion of an adoptee in a class gift:
While there may be testators and trustors who are so concerned
with medieval concepts of “bloodline” and “heirs of the body”
that they would truly be upset at the thought that their hard-won
assets would one day pass into the hands of persons not of their
blood, we cannot formulate general rules of law for the benefit
37
of eccentrics.
Thus, whether an adoptee will be included in the class gift from a
third-party donor depends on (1) the existence of a statute or case
overturning the stranger-to-adoption statute and (2) the retroactive
38
application of the statute or rule.
In addition to adoption generally, adult adoption adds another level
into the analysis. The vast majority of states allow some form of adult
adoption; only six states prohibit or restrict an adult from adopting
39
another. Several of these states are discussed below.
III. WHY WOULD AN ADULT ADOPT ANOTHER ADULT?
In this Part, I will discuss the common and less prevalent reasons
why an adult would adopt another adult, the subsidiary issue of partner
adoption, and the consequences of adoption.
A. Common Reasons
Rein writes that “[t]he motives revealed in adult adoption cases are
40
a testament to the fertility of human imagination.” However, there are
a few common motivations for adopting another adult. First, a stepparent or foster parent may want to adopt an adult with whom they

36. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 503 (W. Va. 1977); Rein,
supra note 1, at 739 (stating that the average testator does not, in fact, prefer blood relatives
over adopted relatives to inherit his or her property).
37. 237 S.E.2d at 503.
38. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
39. Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect
Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 95, 107–08 (2009).
40. Rein, supra note 1, at 750.
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have established a parent–child relationship. 41 Second, the goal of the
adoption could be to gain some sort of benefit for the adoptee, such as
bringing the adoptee within a class gift or guaranteeing the adoptee an
42
intestate share. The benefit could include the adoptee’s right to inherit
43
directly from the adoptor or from a third party “through” the adoptor.
Third, the adoption might have been an attempt to keep collateral
relatives, especially disinherited heirs, from having standing to challenge
44
a disposition of property.
A common motivation that an adult has for adopting another adult
45
is to codify an existing parent–child relationship. “One of the strongest
motives for adult adoption is that it allows individuals to formally and
legally express their commitment to one another by creating a family
46
unit.” For example, a step-parent or foster parent may adopt someone
47
that he or she has raised as his or her own child. For the purposes of
inheritance, the UPC looks to whether there was a parent–child
48
relationship between the parties. To be a parent, the parent must
“behav[e] toward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s
parent and perform[] functions that are customarily performed by a
49
parent.” If there is such a relationship, “the parent is a parent of the
child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate
50
succession.”

41. Statutes that do restrict adult adoption often make an exception for a step-parent.
For example, Alabama law permits adult adoptions when an adult “consents in writing to be
adopted and is related in any degree of kinship . . . or is a stepchild by marriage.” ALA. CODE
§ 26-10A-6 (LexisNexis 2009).
42. See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. 1993) (“Many
jurisdictions limit inquiry into the motives or purposes of an adult adoption. However, most
recognize that adult adoptions for the purpose of creating inheritance rights are valid.”).
43. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 97.
44. Id.; DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 102 (8th ed. 2009) (noting
that “[t]he only persons who have standing to challenge the validity of a will are those who
would take if the will were denied probate”).
45. See supra text accompanying note 41.
46. Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L.
75, 80–81 (1997–1998).
47. See, e.g., Hays v. Hays, 946 So. 2d 867, 870 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (disallowing an
attempt by a step-mother to adopt her step-daughter after her husband’s death because the
relationship did not qualify for the statutory adoption through marriage).
48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(4) (2004) (amended 2008).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 2-116.
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A second motivation is to bring the adoptee within a class gift or to
codify the relationship such that the adoptee will share the adoptor’s
51
estate if he or she were to die intestate. Courts have come to different
results on this issue, especially when the donor of the gift is not the
52
adoptor. Some courts allow an adult adoptee to inherit, for example,
from the parents of the adoptor who give a gift to their grandchildren,
53
while other courts would disallow this gift. For example, in the case In
re Adoption of Berston, a twenty-nine-year-old petitioned to adopt his
mother to bring her within the provisions of a trust created by his
54
The court allowed the adoption, stating that the statute
father.
“unequivocally authorizes a petition for the adoption of ‘an adult’ by
55
‘any person’ as to foreclose any limiting construction.”
Another main motivation to adopt an adult is to deny standing to
potential contestants to a will. “The only persons who have standing to
challenge the validity of a will are those who would take if the will were
denied probate. To gain standing to challenge the will, the decedent’s
56
collateral relatives must first overturn the adoption.” For example, in
Collamore v. Learned, a seventy-year-old man adopted three adults for
57
the purpose of denying his relatives standing to oppose his will. Justice
Holmes, before he was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote that
adopting another adult for the purpose of denying standing to relatives
58
Another example is In re Adoption of
was “perfectly proper.”
Swanson, where the adoptor sought “to prevent collateral claims . . .
59
from remote family members.” The Delaware Supreme Court stated
that beyond the “common sense limitations,” the motive behind an

51. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 38
(2000).
52. Jerry Simon Chasen, Planning for Non-Traditional Families, in ADVANCED ESTATE
PLANNING TECHNIQUES 345, 352 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2006) (noting that some
states have given adult adoptees less rights to inheritance than minor adoptees); Turnipseed,
supra note 39, at 104–05. “Even when statutory language indicates that adopted adults may
qualify as members of a class, courts will not necessarily interpret or apply the law in that
manner when construing wills and trust instruments.” Chasen, supra, at 352.
53. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 104–05.
54. Berston v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Adoption of Berston), 206 N.W.2d 28,
29 (Minn. 1973).
55. Id. at 30 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1971)).
56. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 102.
57. 50 N.E. 518, 518–19 (Mass. 1898).
58. Id. at 519.
59. 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993).
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adult adoption is generally not relevant. 60 To that end, the court allowed
the adoption, denying the adoptor’s relatives standing to challenge his
61
will.
B. Less Prevalent Reasons
In addition to the main motivations for adopting an adult, there are
several collateral reasons to adopt another adult, including to obtain tax
benefits and to circumvent strict housing codes. 62 One such reason is to
63
obtain favorable tax treatment. Through the adoption, the adoptor
may be able to receive the “head of household” status for taxes and may
64
Additionally, the adoptor
be entitled to a dependency deduction.
65
might seek to adopt another adult to avoid an inheritance tax. In re
Adoption of Swanson is an example of a case where an adoptor who
66
sought to avoid an inheritance tax. The adoptor sought “to obtain the
reduced inheritance tax rate which natural and adopted children enjoy
67
The Delaware Supreme Court allowed the
under Delaware law.”
68
adoption. In addition to beneficial tax rates, a person may seek to
adopt another adult to circumvent housing codes. For example, a man
in Colorado sought to adopt his partner to circumvent an ordinance that
required persons living within the applicable zone to be family
69
members. In addition to tax and housing benefits, Turnipseed believes
there could be many benefits of adult adoption, including the following:
access to health insurance coverage and other employee benefits
of the adoptor; allowing recovery in tort actions and survivor
benefits; . . . life insurance beneficiary designations; Social
Security payments; consent authorizations or visitation privileges
60. Id. at 1099.
61. Id.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63–70.
63. Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in
the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 86 (2003).
64. Id.
65. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 105. As of right now, eight states still collect an
inheritance tax. See McGuireWoods LLP, McGuireWoods LLP State Death Tax Chart
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/
state_death_tax_chart.pdf.
66. 623 A.2d at 1096.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1099.
69. W.D.A. v. City & Cnty. of Denver (In re W.D.A.), 632 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. 1981).
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relating to hospitals, jails, and other governmental agencies;
attainment of immigration status; obtaining royalty status; taking
advantage of rent control; and . . . permitting an adopted child of
a university employee to enroll in said university, or a reciprocal
70
university, free of charge.
Thus, whether seeking to codify a parent–child relationship or to
receive some other benefits, there are many motivations for seeking an
adult adoption.
C. Adopting a Partner
There is another area involving partners, both heterosexual and
homosexual, who have attempted to adopt one another. In regards to
homosexual adoption, Turnipseed writes that “[f]or homosexual people
in jurisdictions that do not recognize same-sex marriage (or something
close that yields many of the same benefits and burdens), adoption is
one darn sure (or darn-close to darn sure) way of ensuring inheritance,
71
albeit drastic.” To oppose spouse and partner adoptions, courts have
based their decisions on grounds such as “(1) non-statutory public
policy; (2) very narrow statutory interpretation; (3) fraud on the court
by attempting to conceal the sexual relationship; and/or (4) incest72
Courts supporting the right of spouses and
related arguments.”
partners to adopt argue simply that “adoption is purely a statutory
creation and, if the statute says you can adopt anyone, then you can
73
adopt anyone—case closed.”
74
The first reason that courts reject partner-adoption is public policy.
The most famous cases rejecting partner-adoption come from New
York. The first time the New York courts addressed the issue was in In
re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, where the court allowed one partner
75
to adopt the other. Subsequently, however, the New York courts have
held that one partner, whether homosexual or heterosexual, may not
76
adopt the other. This trend was demonstrated in a later case, where a
fifty-seven-year-old man attempted to adopt his fifty-year-old partner,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 105–06 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id.
435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527, 531 (Fam. Ct. 1981).
In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984).
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with whom he had been living for twenty-five years. 77 The New York
statute simply states that “an adult unmarried person . . . may adopt
78
The court in In re Adoption of Robert Paul P.
another person.”
emphasized the necessity of a parent–child relationship in order to
approve an adoption and stated that adoption “is plainly not a quasimatrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with a legal
imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or
79
homosexual.” The court believed that adopting a partner was “wholly
inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a parent–
80
child relationship for the welfare of the child.” Though New York
public policy prevents partner-adoption, most courts in other states
faced with this question have allowed the adoption and have not found
81
the parties’ relationship to be preventative.
A second way that courts reject partner adoption is by interpreting
the adoption statute narrowly, only allowing adoptions when there is a
82
specified relationship. For example, the court in In re Adoption of
Robert Paul P. required the petitioners to establish a parent–child
relationship to grant the adoption, even though the New York statute
83
has no such limitation; “an adult unmarried person . . . may adopt
84
another person.” Another example is In re Jones, where a thirty-yearold married man attempted to adopt his twenty-year-old lover, who was
85
also married. The court stated that the probate judge “is clothed with
judicial discretion as he considers a petition where one adult seeks to
adopt another” and that “this court has repeatedly said that a statute
will not be construed so as to achieve an absurd, meaningless, or
86
patently inane result.” Thus, in addition to public policy arguments,

77. Id.
78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (Consol. 2009).
79. 471 N.E.2d at 425.
80. Id. (citing Orsini v. Blasi (In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini), 331 N.E.2d 486, 489
(N.Y. 1975)).
81. Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 114–15; see also In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d
1095, 1097 (Del. 1993) (noting that “[m]any jurisdictions limit inquiry into the motives or
purposes of an adult adoption”).
82. Russell G. Donaldson, Annot., Marital or Sexual Relationship Between Parties as
Affecting Right to Adopt, 42 A.L.R.4th 776, 785 (1985); Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 111.
83. 471 N.E.2d at 425.
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (Consol. 2009).
85. 411 A.2d 910, 910 (R.I. 1980).
86. Id. at 911.
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courts also reject partner-adoption by construing the adoption statute
narrowly.
Though some courts reject partner-adoption because of public policy
or statutory construction, some courts have allowed partner-adoption.
One author notes,
It has been held that where the adoption statute in question is
clearly worded and unlimited as to the persons included therein, the
courts are without authority to create any judicial gloss thereon, so
that there would be no justification for limiting the adoption
statute’s applicability to persons not specifically excluded
87
therefrom.
For example, the court in Bedinger v. Graybill’s Executor & Trustee
stated that “[i]t is important to note that the statute is unrestricted and
unqualified. It authorizes any adult person to adopt any person of any
88
age.” Thus, the court is “bound by the statutory law as written and
89
cannot write into it an exception which the legislature did not make.”
The court in Bedinger held that even if the adoption was “incongruous”
with the statute, if the statute did not specifically prevent the adoption,
90
the court was not at liberty to prevent the adoption either. In fact, the
Bedinger court was also faced with a public policy argument, to which
they responded as follows:
It is ably argued by the appellants that the adoption of a wife
is void as against public policy. Public policy is a vague and
indefinite term and is incapable of accurate and precise
definition. The public policy of a state is to be found in its
constitution and statutes, and it is only in the absence of any
expressed or implied declaration in these instruments that it may
be declared by judicial decisions. If the legislature has spoken
clearly and constitutionally, the courts may not substitute their
91
own ideas of public policy.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Donaldson, supra note 82, at 786.
302 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Ky. 1957).
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
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Thus, the court concluded that unless the statute specifically
prohibits the adoption, or a specific pronouncement of public policy is
known or can be gleaned from the statutes, the court is without
92
authority to prevent the adoption.
D. Consequences of Adoption
Although adult adoption has the benefit of codifying a familial
relationship between the adoptor and the adoptee, one of the biggest
93
drawbacks is that the process is generally irrevocable. The adoptor
cannot simply revoke the process in order to disinherit the adoptee,
94
despite “adoptor’s remorse.” One famous case on point is that of
Doris Duke, who was a beneficiary of a trust executed by her father,
95
In 1988, Doris Duke, at age seventy-five, adopted
James Duke.
96
Chandi Heffner, who was thirty-five at the time of the adoption. Duke
subsequently regretted adopting Heffner, and wrote the following in her
will:
[I]t is my intention that Chandi Heffner not be deemed to be my
child for the purposes of disposing of property under this my
Will . . . . Furthermore, it is not my intention, nor do I believe
that it was ever my father’s intention, that Chandi Heffner be
deemed to be a child or lineal descendant of mine for purposes
of disposing of the trust estate . . . .
I am extremely troubled by the realization that Chandi
Heffner may use my 1988 adoption of her . . . to attempt to
benefit financially under the terms of either of the trusts created
97
by my father. . . . I do not wish her to benefit from my estate.
In Heffner’s suit against the trustees of the Doris Duke Trust, the
court ruled that Heffner was not allowed to take under the trust as the
92. Id. at 600.
93. Snodgrass, supra note 46, at 75. But see T.C. Williams, Annot., Annulment or
Vacation of Adoption Decree by Adopting Parent or Natural Parent Consenting to Adoption, 2
A.L.R.2d 887, 903–09 (1948) (identifying considerations of the best interests of the child,
misconduct by the child, fraud or duress, and mutual consent as possible avenues for
revocation by adoptors).
94. Williams, supra note 93, at 903–05 (explaining that courts are reluctant to disturb the
new status of the child unless it is in the best interests of the child).
95. In re Trust of Duke, 702 A.2d 1008, 1011 (N.J. Ch. 1995).
96. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 107.
97. Id. at 107–08.
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descendant of Duke because the meaning of “lineal descendant” did not
98
include adoptees at the time the trusts were executed, in 1924.
However, Heffner sued the executors of the trusts created by Doris’s
99
father and claimed that Doris had promised to support Heffner.
Before the suit went to trial, the executors of the trusts settled with
Heffner for sixty-five million dollars; thus, even though Heffner was not
deemed a lineal descendant of James Duke, she ended up profiting
100
enormously from the adoption. Therefore, because of the irrevocable
nature of adoption, parties contemplating an adoption must be
101
absolutely sure of their decision.
Considering the irrevocability of adoption, why resort to such a
drastic action over other methods of property disposition, such as wills,
trusts, insurance, inter vivos gifts, and pension plans? Each of the
nonprobate options has drawbacks. One nonprobate option is giving
the partner inter vivos gifts. However, inter vivos gifts are irrevocable
and only effective if one partner is significantly wealthier than the
102
Other options include designating the partner as the
other.
103
beneficiary under an insurance policy or creating a joint bank account.
These strategies are similarly effective only if one partner is well-to-do
and are only effective for transferring money, not for transferring
104
property. One practical alternative is to create a revocable inter vivos
trust. With this option, the parties can protect their assets from claims
of undue influence, incapacity, and fraud more effectively than through
105
a will. In a trust, there is a record of many transactions, and the court
will be hesitant, particularly due to the “administrative nightmare,” to
106
However, many clients are
overturn the transactions in the trust.
98. Duke, 702 A.2d at 1021.
99. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 108.
100. Id.
101. Even though the adoption itself is irrevocable, the adoptor could simply disinherit
the adoptee (of the adoptor’s own property) in a later instrument. But at that point, the
parties are going around in circles—especially if one of the reasons for the adoption was to
defeat claims by the adoptor’s family of undue influence, incapacity, fraud, and the like. The
disinherited adoptee is able to contest the adoptor’s will. See Calvin Massey, Designation of
Heirs: A Modest Proposal to Diminish Will Contests, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 586–
87 (2003) (stating that “such disinheritance invites yet another will contest”).
102. Id. at 587.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 579.
106. Id. at 579, 587 (noting that it would be very difficult for a court to “unwind” a
settlor’s transactions with the trust if the court subsequently finds that the settlor lacked
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reluctant to allow another person to hold legal title to their property or
107
are intimidated by the seemingly “complex” nature of trusts. In fact,
studies done in collateral areas, such as why people die intestate and
what kinds of people execute testamentary documents, have found that
people with more education and money are more likely to die with an
108
estate plan. Thus, a trust may be too expensive or “complex” for the
average property owner. “While a fully funded revocable inter vivos
trust may be a reasonably effective remedy to the problem, this and
other standard remedies are likely to remain the province of the
sophisticated and affluent who employ equally sophisticated and
109
affluent estate planners.”
IV. COMPARISON OF JURISDICTIONS
With the background information in place, this Part outlines and
compares the status of adoptees in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and
Minnesota. For each jurisdiction, this Part describes the statute on
adoption, describes the statute on inheritance rights of adoptees, and
discusses the cases that interpret these statutes. It compares several
main factors: (1) statutes regarding adoption and inheritance rights
surrounding adoption, (2) early and modern attitudes toward adoption,
and (3) rights of adult adoptees.
A. Wisconsin
1. Statutes
Wisconsin’s adoption statute is very broad: in Wisconsin, “[a]n adult
110
may be adopted by any other adult, who is a resident of this state.”
The inheritance rights of adopted persons, however, are more
restrictive. In Wisconsin, an adoptee is treated as the biological child of
the adoptive parents, and the parents are treated as the biological
capacity or was unduly influenced); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 206 (noting that
“[a]lthough trusts, too, can be attacked on grounds of incapacity and undue influence, as a
practical matter it is harder to upset a trust if the settlor had a course of dealing with the
trustee to evidence competence and the absence of influence”).
107. See Massey, supra note 101, at 579, 587.
108. See Gary, supra note 51, at 16–17. Gary recaps several studies performed on who
dies intestate and why this is so. The studies have found that the older a person is, the more
likely they are to have an estate plan. Id. Similarly, the wealthier a person is, the likelier he
or she is to have an estate plan. Id.
109. Massey, supra note 101, at 584 (footnote omitted).
110. WIS. STAT. § 882.01 (2009–2010).
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parents of the adoptee for inheritance from and through each other if
one of the following three conditions exists:
1. The decedent or transferor is the adoptive parent or
adopted child.
2. The [adoptee] was a minor at the time of adoption.
3. The [adoptor] raised the [adoptee] in a parent-like
relationship beginning on or before the child’s 15th birthday and
111
lasting for a substantial period or until adulthood.
Thus, despite the broad adoption statute, the inheritance rights
surrounding an adoption are more limited.
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption
Until 1966, Wisconsin had an unfavorable policy toward adoptees
112
An example of
both intestate and in testamentary dispositions.
Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees in intestate cases is In re Matzke’s
Estate, where the supreme court held that because the adoption statutes
were silent on the question of inheritance rights of adoptees, an adult
adoptee had no right to take from her adoptive grandmother’s intestate
113
In the case, the decedent had three children, two of whom
estate.
114
One of the predeceased children had an adopted
predeceased her.
115
daughter. The decedent died intestate, and the statutes provided that
personal property and land should be distributed to children and to
116
The adoption
children of any deceased child by representation.
statute stated that an adopted child would be treated as the child of the
adoptive parents, but was silent on the question of inheritance from
117
The court held that the
anyone other than the adoptive parent.
adopted grandchild was not entitled to take under the statute of descent
118
or distribution.

111. Id. § 854.20(b). In Wisconsin, a person becomes an “adult” at the age of eighteen.
Id. § 990.01(3).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 123–29.
113. Ruch v. Bender (In re Estate of Matzke), 250 Wis. 204, 208, 26 N.W.2d 659, 661
(1947).
114. Id. at 205, 26 N.W.2d at 659.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 207, 26 N.W.2d at 660–61.
118. Id. at 208, 26 N.W.2d at 661.

18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1062

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/22/2012 9:58 PM

[95:1043

An example of Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees in a testamentary
disposition is In re Estate of Uihlein, in which the supreme court held
that the adoptive children of the decedent’s daughter were not allowed
to take under the decedent’s will—a classic “stranger-to-the-adoption”
119
In the case, the decedent died before his grandchildren were
ruling.
120
In attempting to determine whether the adopted children
adopted.
could take as beneficiaries under the will, the court determined that the
statute “changes the legal status of an adopted child but it does not
121
purport to make an adopted child the issue of a parent.” The supreme
court stated that when there is a provision in a will “made for the child
of some person other than testator and a child is adopted by that person
after the death of testator, the adopted child is not, in the absence of
contrary compelling circumstances, entitled to share in a gift to children
122
or issue of the third person.”
In 1966, Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees became more liberal
when the supreme court in In re Will of Adler reversed the stranger-to123
The court held that the adopted daughter of the
the-adoption rule.
testator’s niece could inherit under a trust for the benefit of the
124
In the case, with facts
testator’s nieces and nephews and their issue.
nearly identical to those in In re Estate of Uihlein, the testator
established a testamentary trust for the benefit of his nieces and
nephews and their issue, one of whom had adopted a child after the
125
testator’s death but prior to the distribution of the trust. At the time
In re Estate of Uihlein was decided, adopted children could not inherit
126
under the statutes because they were not “heirs of the body.”
However, when In re Will of Adler was decided, the adoption statute
provided that “the effect of the order of adoption is to completely
change the legal status of the adopted person from that of a child of the
127
About
natural parents to that of a child of the adoptive parents.”

119. 269 Wis. 170, 177, 68 N.W.2d 816, 821 (1955).
120. Id. at 178, 68 N.W.2d at 821.
121. Id. at 173, 68 N.W.2d at 819. “Issue” was “construed as meaning blood
descendants.” Id. at 177, 68 N.W.2d at 821.
122. Id. at 176, 68 N.W.2d at 820.
123. Smith v. Reinhart (In re Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 263, 140 N.W.2d 219, 226
(1966).
124. Id. at 263, 140 N.W.2d at 226.
125. Id. at 255, 260, 263, 140 N.W.2d at 222, 225, 226.
126. Id. at 260, 140 N.W.2d at 225.
127. Id. at 257, 140 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 322.07(1) (1947)).

18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

INCONSISTENT INHERITANCE RIGHTS

6/22/2012 9:58 PM

1063

reversing the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule, the court stated the
following regarding the theory of the importance of blood relationships:
This theory is completely contrary to the present attitude of
the family and of the public toward adoption. The tendency,
desire, and public policy in every adoption is to completely
absorb an adopted child into a family unit and to make his status
in fact indistinguishable from that of a natural child, not only in
his relationship with his adoptive parents, but, also, with the
general public and with relatives who are not immediate
128
members of the family circle.
Thus, Wisconsin endorsed a more favorable policy toward adoptees
129
starting in 1966.
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees
Today, adoptees will inherit property only if the transferor of the
property is also the adoptor, if the adoptee was adopted before the age
of eighteen, or the adoptee was raised in the adoptor’s household on or
130
In 2004, in In re Estate of
before the adoptee’s fifteenth birthday.
Pawlisch, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that an adult adoptee
was not entitled to take under the trust of his adoptive grandfather
because he was not adopted as a minor, nor was he raised in the
adoptive parent’s household before the age of fifteen, as the statutes
131
require. In the case, the donor established a testamentary trust for the
132
Carl did not have any
benefit of his son Carl and Carl’s issue.
133
children, but he adopted his nephew Hans when Hans was forty-seven.
The statute at the time of the will’s execution included adopted children
within the meaning of “issue” in a class gift if the adoptee “was adopted
after having been raised as a member of the household by the adoptive
134
parent from the child’s 15th birthday or before.” The court held that
the adoption did not entitle Hans to take the remainder of the trust

128. Id. at 262, 140 N.W.2d at 225.
129. See id.
130. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010).
131. Pawlisch v. Otto V. Pawlisch Trust (In re Estate of Pawlisch), No. 03-1430, 2004 WL
35466, ¶¶ 11, 24, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004).
132. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
133. Id. ¶ 11.
134. WIS. STAT. § 851.51(3) (1991–1992).
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assets because the donative document did not include adopted children
within the meaning of “issue,” nor did the statute allow adult adoptees
to take within a class gift because Hans was not raised in Carl’s
135
household before the age of fifteen.
B. Illinois
1. Statutes
In Illinois, adults may be adopted if they have “resided in the home
of the persons intending to adopt [them] at any time for more than 2
years continuously preceding the commencement of an adoption
proceeding, or in the alternative that such persons are related to [them]
136
within a degree set forth in the definition of a related child.” For an
adopted child to inherit from the adopting parents and the lineal and
collateral kindred of the parents, the child must either be adopted by or
137
reside with the adopting parents before reaching age eighteen.
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption
In Illinois, similar to Wisconsin, there was an early preference for
heirs related by blood over those related by adoption. For example, in
1924 in Miller v. Wick, the testator’s will stated that his nephew was to
receive the principal of the trust at “such time in his life as he shall have
138
a child, his lawful issue.” The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
an adopted child was not the “lawful issue” of the testator’s heir and was
not entitled to take under the terms of the trust established by the
139
testator’s will. By 1947, however, the Illinois courts were more open135. Pawlisch, 2004 WL 35466, ¶¶ 24–26.
136. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 (West 2009). The term “related child” means “a
child subject to adoption where either or both of the adopting parents stands in any of the
following relationships to the child by blood or marriage: parent, grand-parent, brother, sister,
step-parent, step-grandparent, step-brother, step-sister, uncle, aunt, great-uncle, great-aunt,
or cousin of first degree.” Id. 50/1.
137. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–4 (West 2007). Even though the statute only
discusses the inheritance rights of an “adopted child,” the Illinois Appellate Court explained
that the legislature was referring to the “parent–child” relationship created by the adoption,
and that the word “child” cannot be interpreted to mean “minor” since Illinois permits adult
adoptions. Roeder v. Buckman (In re Estate of Brittin), 664 N.E.2d 687, 690–91 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
138. 142 N.E. 490, 491 (Ill. 1924).
139. Id. at 492 (noting that “[w]e think the rational and reasonable understanding of
testator’s purpose, to be arrived at from the language employed in the will, is that he wished
appellant to have a child born in lawful wedlock, in which event, if the child attained the age
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minded toward the inheritance rights of adoptees; for example, in In re
Harmount’s Estate, the appellate court held that in the case of a
predeceased legatee, the adopted children of the deceased legatee were
140
entitled to receive the inheritance.
The progression of the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule in Illinois is
similar to that of Wisconsin. Documents executed before 1955 were
generally held to exclude adopted children; for example, in Neissl v.
Hartman, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the adoptive grandchild
of the testator was not entitled to take under the testator’s testamentary
141
trust. The terms of trust authorized the testator’s children to appoint
142
However, the document was
trust funds to their own children.
executed before the adoption occurred, and the testator was unaware of
143
the existence of the adopted children. In 1955, the statute governing
144
the inheritance rights of adoptees was amended. The amended statute
declared that by default, adoptees would be entitled to inherit from the
145
collateral kindred of their adoptive parents. For example, in Martin v.
Gerdes, the adoptee was entitled to take in the testator’s estate even
though the adoption occurred after the testamentary documents were
executed because “an adopted child is a natural child unless the terms of
146
The court did not find
the instrument ‘plainly’ indicate otherwise.”
of three years, appellant should become the owner of the principal of the trust fund”).
140. Michael v. Michael (In re Harmount’s Estate), 83 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. App. Ct.
1949). When this case was decided, 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 14 (1947) stated that adopted
children could not inherit “property from a lineal or collateral kindred of the adopting parent
per stirpes or property expressly limited to the body of the adopting parent.” In re
Harmount’s Estate, 83 N.E.2d at 757. However, the court decided that under the anti-lapse
statute, 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 49 (1947), the descendants of a predeceased legatee, including
adopted children, were allowed to inherit property that the predeceased legatee was entitled
to inherit. In re Harmount’s Estate, 83 N.E.2d at 757–58.
141. 196 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). In another example, the Supreme Court of
Illinois looked at the adoption statutes from 1941. Ford v. Newman, 396 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ill.
1979). The court found it persuasive that the testamentary document was executed before the
adoption occurred and that the Illinois statute at the time prohibited adoptees from taking
property from the adopting parent’s collateral kindred. Id. at 541.
142. Neissl, 196 N.E.2d at 528.
143. Id. at 530.
144. See Martin v. Gerdes, 523 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing the
change in the law that overturned the “stranger-to-the-adoption” presumption). The new law
was not applied retroactively, which resulted in courts construing any document executed
before September 1, 1955, under the old law; the old law stated that adoptees could not
inherit from the collateral kindred of their parents. Id. (quoting 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 2–4
(1955)).
145. 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 2–4 (1955).
146. Id. at 612.

18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

1066

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/22/2012 9:58 PM

[95:1043

any language in the instrument that “plainly” indicated an intent to
147
exclude adopted children.
Despite the more inclusive policy toward adoptees, the language of
the testamentary document can override the statute; it is only in the
absence of language that the court can use the statute as an interpretive
148
For example, in Cross v. Cross, the testator gave her son the
aid.
power of appointment to distribute the contents of her trust to her
149
“descendants” through his will. The Illinois Appellate Court held that
the adopted grandson was not entitled to take under the will because the
language “descendant” signified that the testator intended her estate to
150
go to a blood relative.
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees
Following the statutes on the inheritance rights of adoptees, the
courts have been more willing to grant adult adoptees inheritance rights.
For example, in In re Estate of Brittin, the Illinois Appellate Court
permitted the adoptive grandchildren of the testator to inherit from the
151
In the case, the decedent had raised
testator’s intestate estate.
William Eugene from the time he was three and adopted Eugene when
152
The court
he was forty-six, at which time Eugene had five children.
stated that there was “no statutory distinction between an adopted adult
and an adopted minor with respect to the nature of the legal relationship

147. Id. at 611. The Illinois Supreme Court, in First National Bank v. King, also
discussed what constitutes clear intent to exclude adoptees and concluded that “the testator’s
use of the terms ‘lawful descendants’ and ‘per stirpes’ are not sufficient to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that [the testator] intended to exclude adopted children.” 651
N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ill. 1995). Another case which discussed the evidence needed to rebut the
presumption that adoptees are included within testamentary documents is Altenheim German
Home v. Bank of America, in which the testamentary instrument allowed adopted
grandchildren to take in the estate, but was silent on whether adopted great-grandchildren
could take in the estate. 875 N.E.2d 1172, 1174–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). The court held that
the instrument’s silence was not enough to rebut the presumption of inclusion. Id. at 1182.
The courts have even gone so far as to say that language such as “natural children” and “heirs
of the body” is not enough to overcome the presumption. See Roller v. Allison (In re Estate
of Roller), 880 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
148. See supra note 147 and sources cited therein (giving examples of what language
does not overcome the inclusive presumption toward adoptees).
149. 532 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
150. Id. at 489.
151. Roeder v. Buckman (In re Estate of Brittin), 664 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
152. Id. at 688.
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created between the adoptee and the adopting parent.” 153 Thus, because
a parent–child relationship was created between the testator and
Eugene, Eugene’s children were considered the natural grandchildren of
154
Even though the inheritance statute only discusses the
the testator.
inheritance rights of an adopted “child,” both adopted children and
adopted adults are allowed to inherit from their adoptive parents as if
155
they were natural children.
C. Indiana
1. Statutes
Indiana’s statutes regarding adoption and inheritance rights are very
favorable to adoptees. Indiana has a very broad adult adoption statute:
“An individual who is at least eighteen (18) years of age may be adopted
by a resident of Indiana,” with proper jurisdiction and the consent of the
156
adult. According to the Indiana Statutes,
For all purposes of intestate succession, including succession
by, through, or from a person, both lineal and collateral, an
adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of the child’s
adopting parents, and the child shall cease to be treated as a
child of the natural parents and of any previous adopting
157
parents.
The Indiana Statutes also make it clear that courts should presumptively
include an adoptee when construing a will or a trust if that person was
adopted before age twenty-one and adopted before the death of the
158
testator.

153. Id. at 690.
154. Id. at 691.
155. Id. at 690–91.
156. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-2-1 (LexisNexis 2007).
157. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (LexisNexis 2011).
158. Id. § 29-1-6-1(d) (providing that when a court is construing a will, “any person
adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday before the death of the testator shall be
considered the child of the adopting parent or parents and not the child of the natural . . .
parents”).
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2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption
In 1953, Indiana reversed the presumption that an adoptee cannot
inherit property from a testator or deceased person intestate who was a
159
stranger to the adoption. The new statute specifically addresses both
testate and intestate situations and instructs courts that in interpreting
wills, “any person adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday
before the death of the testator shall be considered the child of the
160
However, the statute is not applied
adopting parent or parents.”
161
retroactively. An example of a case applying the new presumption is
Adams v. Slater, in which the child of the decedent’s adopted daughter
162
The
was entitled to inherit from her adoptive grandmother’s estate.
Indiana statute at the time, which was very similar to the present statute,
stated that for the purposes of inheritance, an adult adoptee is “entitled
163
to inherit as a child from the adopting parent or parents.” The court
stated that
[I]t has no right to allow collateral relatives to disturb either the
relationship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child or the
relationship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child’s natural
child who, in both a legal and moral sense, should retain all the
164
rights of a natural grandchild.

159. Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 82–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The stranger-toadoption presumption remained in effect for trusts, however, until 2003. The 2003 statute,
which presumptively includes adoptees within a trust executed by someone other than the
adoptor, is to be applied retroactively unless inclusion would either adversely affect a right
given to any beneficiary or give someone a share who was not intended to benefit from the
trust. See Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d 921, 928–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing IND.
CODE ANN. § 30-4-1-4 (West 2009)).
160. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d).
161. See Lutz, 758 N.E.2d at 83 (applying the rule at the time the document was
executed to determine whether an adopted grandchild could inherit in her adoptive
grandfather’s trust for the benefit of his grandchildren). The court applied the statute at the
time the document was executed, which excluded adopted children and grandchildren unless
there was “something in the extraneous circumstances to rebut said presumption.” Id.
Because there were no extraneous circumstances favoring the adopted grandchild, the
adoptee was not allowed to inherit from the trust. Id.
162. 175 N.E.2d 706, 710–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961).
163. Id. at 708 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 6-208 (1953)).
164. Id. at 710–11.
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Similar to Illinois, the terms of an inter vivos trust supersede the
165
For instance, in Walz v. Walz, the court held
default probate laws.
that a child the settlor adopted after the execution of his trust was not
entitled to take where the settlor’s natural children were individually
166
named as beneficiaries of the trust.
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees
The statutes provide that an adoptee is presumptively included in a
will or trust if adopted before age twenty-one and adopted before the
167
Unless the testamentary document indicates
death of the testator.
otherwise, any person adopted after turning twenty-one will be excluded
168
Thus, the policy toward adult adoptees is slightly
from a class gift.
more generous in Indiana than in Wisconsin and Illinois, but not by
169
much.
D. Minnesota
1. Statutes
In Minnesota, “any adult person may be adopted, regardless of the
170
adult person’s residence” with the consent of the adult to be adopted.
The adoption “establishes a parent–child relationship between the
adopting parent or parents and the person adopted, including the right
165. See Walz v. Walz (In re Walz’s Living Trust), 423 N.E.2d 729, 730–32, 737 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (holding that a child the testator adopted was not entitled to take under the
testator’s inter vivos trust where the terms of his trust specifically stated that the trust was for
the benefit of his two natural children to share equally). The case also discussed the
difference between a testamentary document, which will be subject to the laws of probate,
such as a will and testamentary trust, and a non-testamentary document, such as an inter vivos
trust, which is not controlled by the probate laws (rather, the statutes are used as an
interpretive aid). Id. at 732–34.
166. Id. at 730–31, 737.
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that when a court is
construing a will, “any person adopted prior to the person's twenty-first birthday before the
death of the testator shall be considered the child of the adopting parent or parents and not
the child of the natural . . . parents”).
168. See id.
169. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010) (an adoptee will only take if the decedent is
also the adoptor, the adoptee was adopted as a minor, or the adoptee was raised in the
household of the adopter prior to turning fifteen); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–4 (West
2007) (an adoptee will inherit from the adopting parents and their “lineal and collateral
kindred” if the adoptee is adopted by or resides with the adopting parents before the adoptee
turns eighteen).
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.241 (Supp. 2011).
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to inherit . . . .” 171 Because a parent–child relationship is established,
“the parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of the parent
172
for the purposes of intestate succession.” Additionally, Minnesota has
established a rule that “[a]dopted individuals . . ., and their respective
descendants if appropriate to the class, are included in class gifts and
other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for intestate
173
succession.”
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption
Minnesota has a liberal policy toward adoptees: whether intestate or
in a testamentary document, “adopted children stand in the same
174
Thus, words such as
position as biological children in all respects.”
“issue,” “children,” and “descendants” will presumptively include
175
adoptees. Further, words such as “issue of her body,” without further
176
In fact, the
explanation, are not sufficient to exclude adoptees.
Minnesota courts, in accordance with the statutes, have made it very
clear that adoptees and natural children are to be treated equally as long
as there is not explicit language to the contrary:
We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of
begetting offspring—which is done even by animals without any
family ties—but the emotional and spiritual experience of living
together that creates a family. The family relationship is created
far more by love, understanding, and mutual recognition of
reciprocal duties and bonds, than by physical genesis. The
marriage ceremony gives recognition to this fact as between
spouses. Formal adoption recognizes this fact as between
177
parents and children.
In the case In re Will of Patrick, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the adopted nephew of the testator was presumptively entitled to
take under the testator’s trust, which was for the benefit of the testator’s
171. Id.
172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-116 (Supp. 2011).
173. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-705 (West 2002).
174. In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn.
1977) (quoting Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d
888, 890 (Minn. 1960)).
175. In re Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d at 890.
176. Harrington, 250 N.W.2d at 167.
177. In re Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d at 890 (footnote omitted).
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siblings and their descendants. 178 In another case, the adoptee was
entitled to take from the trust established by her adoptive grandparent
because of the presumption in favor of adoptees, even though the trust
was for the benefit of the testator’s daughter and the “issue of her
179
body.”
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees
The inclusive presumptions established in Minnesota extend to adult
180
adoptees. For example, in In re Trust Created Under Agreement with
Lane, the settlor’s adoptive great-grandson, who was adopted as an
181
In the case, the
adult, was entitled to take from the settlor’s trust.
settlor, who adopted his wife’s brother, created a trust for the benefit of
the brother’s sons (his two grandsons) and their issue, but he specifically
182
One of the
disinherited the brother’s daughter (his granddaughter).
testator’s grandsons, George Barbour, was unmarried and had no issue,
but he decided to adopt Charles DeWitt, the adult son of the testator’s
183
disinherited granddaughter. The court stated that “the long history of
embracing adult adoption, combined with the lack of explicit exclusion
of the children of [the testator’s granddaughter], leads to the conclusion
that the district court did not err in holding that Charles DeWitt was
184
George Barbour’s son and a beneficiary of the trust in question.”
In accordance with the broad adoption statute, Minnesota courts
have held that neither the motivations behind an adoption nor public
policy arguments are relevant in deciding whether to grant the
185
In In re Adoption of Berston, a twenty-nine-year-old
adoption.
petitioned to adopt his mother to bring her within the provisions of a
186
The court allowed the adoption, stating
trust created by his father.
that the statute “unequivocally authorizes a petition for the adoption of
178. Id. at 892 (describing the presumption in favor of adoptees and remanding to the
trial court to determine if it was shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator
intended to exclude the adoptee). This case also provides evidence that Minnesota had
overturned the stranger-to-the-adoption rule by 1960. See id.
179. Harrington, 250 N.W.2d at 167.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 181–84.
181. 660 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
182. Id. at 423–24.
183. Id. at 424.
184. Id. at 427.
185. See Berston v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Adoption of Berston), 206
N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. 1973).
186. Id. at 29.
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‘an adult’ by ‘any person’ as to foreclose any limiting construction. Any
considerations of public policy are matters for reappraisal by legislative
187
amendment.”
Thus, Minnesota has the most favorable policies for adult adoptees
compared to the three states discussed above. An adult adoptee will
take intestate and in testamentary documents as long as there are not
188
explicit words to the contrary. In contrast, in Wisconsin, adoptees will
inherit property only if the transferor of the property is also the adoptor,
if the adoptee was adopted as a minor, or the adoptee was raised in the
189
In
adoptor’s household on or before his or her fifteenth birthday.
Illinois, adoptees will not be treated as a descendant of the adoptor if
they were adopted after the age of eighteen or not raised in the
190
Finally, in
adoptor’s household before their eighteenth birthday.
Indiana, unless the testamentary document indicates otherwise, any
person adopted after he or she turns twenty-one will be excluded from a
191
class gift.
V. SOLUTIONS AND PROPOSALS
Based on the jurisdictional comparison, which only scratches the
surface of adult adoptees’ rights, this area of the law would benefit from
reform aiming to create more uniformity across jurisdictions. An
adoptor who undertakes the drastic measure of adopting another adult
usually has a close and loving relationship with the adoptee, and the
goal of the adoption is to make the adoptee a genuine member of the
family.
A default rule that uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s
inheritance rights is in line with the adoptor’s motivation for the
adoption. Proposals that may alleviate the inconsistency include
embracing a functional definition of “family,” allowing partners to
designate an heir, and adopting a more inclusive uniform law on the
inheritance rights of adult adoptees.
187. Id. at 30.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 182–187. The Minnesota statutes are clear that
adoptees are to be treated equally both intestate and in testamentary documents. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 524.2-116 (Supp. 2011) (“[T]he parent is a parent of the child and the child is a
child of the parent for the purposes of intestate succession.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-705
(West 2002) (“Adopted individuals . . ., and their respective descendants if appropriate to the
class, are included in class gifts and other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules
for intestate succession.”).
189. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010).
190. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–4 (2007).
191. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011).
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A. Functional Definition of Family
Professor Mary Patricia Treuthart wrote an article explaining how
the law and social institutions have not caught up with the way people
exist as families today, and she proposed that instead of defining
“family” through marriage, we should define “family” by an
192
examination of the closeness of the relationship. She explains that
The traditional family with a breadwinner-husband and a
homemaker-wife who live with their biological children is
certainly an anomaly in America today. Although existing
families have diverse characteristics, the functional aspects of
this basic social unit remain the same: the provision of love and
support to its members. Social institutions and the law have not
kept up with the changes in family life. As a result, many groups
which function as families are not recognized as such, and are
denied benefits which society bestows upon families which
193
resemble the traditional model, if only superficially.
The U.S. Census Bureau defines “family” as “a group of two people
or more . . . related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing
194
A survey done by an insurance company in 1989 asked
together.”
1,200 random adults how they would define “family,” and a large
majority responded with the following broad definition: “a group of
195
Treuthart writes that
people who love and care for one another.”
defining a family based on marriage can be contradictory, since it is

192. Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26
GONZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1990–1991); see also Gary, supra note 51, at 5 (proposing a similar idea
and using a functional definition of family to define “family” in intestacy statutes). Gary
states that
[a] functional definition of family . . . tries to determine what a family does, what
functions family members perform for each other and what relationships family
members have with each other. The definition attempts to include as family
members those who function as family members, those for whom close, loving,
caring and nurturing family relationships exist.
Gary, supra note 51, at 5.
193. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 91–92.
194. Current Population Survey (CPS)—Definitions and Explanations, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012);
cf. Gary, supra note 51, at 27 (noting that “[i]ntestacy statutes almost uniformly use a formal
definition of family: persons related by blood, marriage or adoption”).
195. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 97.
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neither
permanent,
nor
requires
“procreation,
economic
196
interdependence[, or] even sexual exclusivity.” However, “[d]efining
a family as a community of persons performing the functions of a family
would seem to do more to promote the underlying values on which the
197
policy favoring marriage is based.”
Though Treuthart’s article focuses on a more functional definition of
“family,” as an alternative to defining “family” based on marriage, her
article is applicable to the area of adult adoption. If the concept of
“family” were defined by the functional relationship between people, an
adult adoptee would certainly be presumptively included within the
198
Uniformly including adult adoptees within a “family”
family unit.
seems in line with the changing social mores regarding what defines a
199
As the Minnesota Supreme
family and who is included in a family.
Court stated, “We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of
begetting offspring—which is done even by animals without any family
ties—but the emotional and spiritual experience of living together that
200
creates a family.”
Even though Treuthart’s theory is applicable to adult adoptions, this
approach has the limitation of the vague concept of “family.” How
should “family” be defined? If the legislature defines “family” by the
nature of the relationship between parties, this will leave the court with
a burden of subjectively analyzing that relationship, which would be a
time-consuming process and essentially leave a large gap for courts to
fill with their own social policies. A more objective way to define
“family” (and one that would be less burdensome for courts) would look
at whether the parties share, for example, “economic responsibilities,”
201
Instead of looking at the relationship
chores, and child-rearing.
between parties, courts could look at objective factors surrounding the
relationship. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in determining

196. Id. at 98.
197. Id.
198. Any testamentary dispositions excluding the adult adoptee would have to be
respected by the courts.
199. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 91 n.1 (noting that a “traditional” family with a
working father, stay-at-home mother, and children constitutes only six percent of families as
of 1979 and that as of 1989, only 27% of U.S. households consisted of two parents with
children, whereas in 1970 forty percent of households had two parents and children.).
200. Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888, 890
(Minn. 1960).
201. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 113.
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whether halfway house residents could be considered a “family” for the
purposes of zoning regulations, stated that the residents
must exhibit a kind of stability, permanency and functional
lifestyle which is equivalent to that of a traditional family
unit. . . . The individual lifestyles of the residents and the
transient nature of their residencies would not permit the group
to possess the elements of stability and permanency which have
202
long been associated with single-family occupancy.
An approach that combines objective factors, such as sharing
“economic responsibilities” and household tasks, with subjective factors,
such as the stability and permanency of the relationship, would be a
feasible way to define “family” that would presumptively include adult
adoptees.
B. Designation of an Heir for Partners
As an alternative to adult adoption entirely, Professor Calvin
Massey expands on an idea that has existed since Roman times: He
proposes that states should “enable people to designate their heirs, to
the partial or total exclusion of those persons who would otherwise be
203
Massey argues that
the actor’s heirs absent the designation.”
designating an heir is a good solution to contesting the will, which is a
common problem when the decedent’s estate plan is unpopular within
204
In fact, the ability to designate an heir already
the natural family.
205
exists in Arkansas and Ohio.
202. Open Door Alcoholism Program, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 491 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
203. Massey, supra note 101, at 581.
204. Id. at 583.
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-8-102 (2004) (stating that “when any person desires to make
a person an heir at law, it shall be lawful to do so by a declaration in writing in favor of the
person, to be acknowledged before any judge, justice of the peace, clerk of any court, or
before any court of record in this state”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (LexisNexis
2011). Ohio also allows a person to designate an heir:
A person of sound mind and memory may appear before the probate judge of
the person’s county and in the presence of such judge and two disinterested persons
of that person’s acquaintance, file a written declaration declaring that, as the
person’s free and voluntary act, the person did designate and appoint another,
stating the name and place of residence of the other person specifically, to stand
toward the person in the relation of an heir at law in the event of the person’s
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Why would designating an heir be better than an adult adoption?
When the motivation for the adoption is to codify some type of legal
relationship between partners, adult adoption (which creates the status
of parent–child) “provides neither an adequate definition for the
relationship resulting from the adult adoption . . . nor an adequate
resolution of the testamentary and dissolution problems inherent in
206
It will also be useful in states that prevent
same-sex cohabitation.”
207
partner adoption for public policy reasons, such as New York. In New
York, one partner cannot adopt another, but if one could designate the
other as his or her heir, the underlying motivation for the adoption
(presumably providing for the partner after death) would be fulfilled.
Finally, another benefit of designating an heir instead of adopting an
208
adult is that the designation of an heir is revocable.
Designating an heir between partners would be practical, but when
the motivation for the adoption is to codify an existing parent–child
relationship or to bring the adoptee within a class gift, adoption seems
209
In Blackwell v.
to be the better option based on existing case law.
Bowman, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a designated heir could not
inherit through his designator from the estate of the designator’s
210
Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the
brother.
children of the designated heir cannot inherit from the designator; the
only relationship created by designating an heir is between the
death. . . . From then on the person designated will stand in the same relation, for
all purposes, to the declarant as the person designated could if a child born in lawful
wedlock. The rules of inheritance will be the same between the person designated
and the relations by blood of the declarant, as if so born.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15.
206. Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 681, 691 (1990).
207. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that
adopting a partner is “wholly inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a
parent–child relationship for the welfare of the child.”).
208. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (stating that after one year, the
declarant may have such designation vacated).
209. See Albert H. Leyerle, The Ohio Designated Heir Statute, 21 AKRON L. REV. 391,
399–400 (1988) (explaining that there are significant grey areas with the statute and that as
opposed to adoption, the designated heir cannot inherit “through” the designator).
210. 80 N.E.2d 493, 494, 498 (Ohio 1948) (stating that “the rational interpretation of the
language . . . is that when a declarant has designated an heir, that heir stands only as to
declarant and not his family or relatives, in the same relation, for all purposes, as designee
would if a child born in lawful wedlock; and that the rules of inheritance as to the property of
declarant will be the same between him and the relatives by blood of declarant as if designee
had been so born”).
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designator and the designated heir. 211 Thus, as it stands right now,
designation of an heir would be a better option only for those who
would be prohibited from adoption.
With the solution, the statutory rules create inherent difficulties in
determining the property rights of the designated heirs and natural
family members. For example, suppose the testator dies leaving a piece
of real property to his children, then to their legal heirs. One of the
testator’s children did not have any natural children but had designated
an heir under the statute. Should the designated heir be allowed to take
the property after the designator’s death? What if the language in the
will had stated that the property would benefit the “issue of my body”?
Should the court follow the progression of adoption, where adoptees
may still be included in a gift despite language that limits gifts to the
212
“heirs of my body”? One can imagine a host of difficulties presented
with designating an heir, such as how the designation affects the antilapse statutes and disinherited heirs. As a result of these difficulties, this
solution works best with small and uncomplicated estates.
C. Uniform Law with Inclusive Policy Toward Adult Adoptees
The majority of the time, the goal of the adoption is to take in the
person as a genuine member of the family. A default rule that
uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights is generally in line
with the adoptor’s motivation for the adoption. The UPC is highly
213
Today, the
influential in creating uniformity and instituting reform.
UPC suggests that if the transferor is not the adoptive parent, an
adoptee will not take in a class gift unless: “(1) the adoption took place
211. See Kirsheman v. Paulin, 98 N.E.2d 26, 32 (Ohio 1951) (stating that “a ‘designated
heir’ reaches the status of a child only upon the death of his designator, and if such designated
heir predeceases his designator the children of the former do not become heirs at law or next
of kin of the designator so as to inherit from him”).
212. See In re Trusts Created with Agreement by Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 167
(Minn. 1977) (holding that the adoptee was entitled to take from the trust established by her
adoptive grandparent because of the presumption in favor of adoptees, even though the trust
was for the benefit of the testator’s daughter and the “issue of her body”).
213. Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 599–600 (1985) (stating that the UPC was adopted
outright in fourteen states and highly influential in non-adopting states). In 1985, Andersen
found more than fifty cases from non-adopting states where the courts “suggest[ed] UPC
sections that legislators ought to consider and demonstrate[d] how advocates might
effectively use the Code.” Id. at 609. Advocates can use the UPC “as secondary authority in
a manner similar to the restatements and as an aid to interpreting legislative history in
jurisdictions that have considered specific UPC provisions.” Id.
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before the adoptee reached [18] years of age; (2) the adoptive parent
was the adoptee’s stepparent or foster parent; or (3) the adoptive parent
functioned as a parent of the adoptee before the adoptee reached [18]
214
Although the age of eighteen is in brackets, signaling
years of age.”
that the UPC does not anticipate uniformity on this issue, the format of
the rule is restrictive and only includes adult adoptees if they meet one
215
of the exceptions. The UPC could create more uniformity and a more
favorable policy toward adult adoptees. First, it could have a general
policy of inclusion (with exclusion as the exception), and second, it
216
could eliminate or raise the age by which the adoption must occur.
The solution should be geared toward the status of adoptees within
class gifts. There seems to be uniformity where the decedent is the
adoptee’s parent: the adoptee will be included within a class gift and the
217
The status of an adoptee
adoptee will be entitled to take intestate.
only becomes complicated where the adoptee could potentially be
included within a class gift from a transferor who is not also the adoptor.
Uniformity and inclusivity for adoptees in class gifts are beneficial for at
least three reasons: First, many scholars approve of adult adoption, even
218
for collateral reasons, such as denying standing to natural heirs.
Second, the adoption statutes purport to provide a total transplantation
from the old family to the new family, which should include adult
219
adoptees. Third, some courts have recognized that it is the nature of
the relationship between parties that is crucial, not the status of the
220
blood relationship.
A law that would create uniformity for adult adoptees’ inheritance
rights under class gifts is supported by scholarly approval of adult
221
For instance, Justice Holmes wrote that adopting another
adoption.
adult for the purpose of denying standing to relatives was “perfectly
222
Another example is In re Adoption of Swanson, where the
proper.”

214. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(f) (2004) (amended 2008).
215. Id.
216. See Andersen, supra note 213 (explaining the great influence the UPC has over
state probate laws).
217. Rein, supra note 1, at 733.
218. See infra text accompanying notes 222–225.
219. Rein, supra note 1, at 719.
220. See Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888,
890 (Minn. 1960).
221. See infra text accompanying notes 222–225.
222. Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 518–19 (Mass. 1898).
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adoptor sought “to prevent collateral claims . . . from remote family
223
The court stated that beyond the “common sense
members.”
limitations,” the motive behind an adult adoption is generally not
224
If scholars are willing to support adult adoptions, even for
relevant.
motivations that would disrupt the testator’s testamentary disposition, it
seems that, overall, there should be a more inclusive policy toward adult
adoptees. One would have to think that the vast majority of adult
adoptions occur for pure reasons, such as out of love and affection,
rather than to upset a testamentary disposition, especially considering
225
the permanence of adult adoptions once they are affected.
In addition to general approval of adult adoption, a more inclusive
policy toward adult adoptees is supported by the general policy of
226
When the first adoption
adoption statutes—total transplantation.
statutes were passed, adoptees were treated differently than blood
relatives and were barred from inheriting from third-party donors under
227
In contrast, statutes today treat
the “stranger-to-the-adoption rule.”
228
adopted children as “full-fledged” members of the adoptive family.
Today, the overarching goal of adoption statutes is to promote the best
interests of the adoptee, a goal accomplished by totally transplanting the
229
With the same “common sense
adoptee into the new family.
limitations,” this general policy of inclusion should be extended to adult
230
adoptees. Considering that the adoptee loses all rights to inherit from
their natural family, there is a deterrent to adopting for deceitful
231
reasons.
In addition to scholarly support and the goal of total transplantation
of adoption statutes, there is a public policy reason to create an inclusive
223. 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993).
224. Id. at 1097, 1099.
225. Snodgrass, supra note 46, at 75 (reporting that adoption is permanent); see also
Smith v. Reinhart (In re Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 262, 140 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Wis. 1966)
(stating that “[a]doptions are almost without exception made for the purpose of making the
adopted child an integral part of the family circle for all purposes”).
226. Rein, supra note 1, at 719.
227. Id. at 771 (quoting Cahn, supra note 5, at 1128).
228. Id. at 772.
229. See Kelly v. Iverson (In re Estates of Donnelly), 502 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash.
1972); Rein, supra note 1, at 713, 719.
230. In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del. 1993).
231. See WIS. STAT. § 854.20(1) (2009–2010) (“[A] legally adopted person ceases to be
treated as a child of the person’s birth parents” except where the person is adopted by a stepparent, in which case the adoptee is still treated as the child of the natural parent who married
the step-parent.).
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presumption toward adult adoptees: a “family” can be created just as
much through adoption as it can through blood relationships. The
Minnesota courts, in accordance with the statutes, have treated adoptees
the same as natural children as long as there is not explicit language to
the contrary in the testamentary disposition: “The family relationship is
created far more by love, understanding, and mutual recognition of
232
reciprocal duties and bonds, than by physical genesis.” If the adoptor
and adoptee choose to undergo the irreversible process of legally
codifying a parent–child relationship, they should be entitled to the
benefits stemming from any natural family relationship, including rights
to inheritance. Thus, the uniform policy should presumptively include
adult adoptees within a testamentary disposition, with limitations upon
such right as the exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
As summarized by the comparison of laws in Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana, and Minnesota, the inheritance rights of adult adoptees vary
across jurisdictions. The adult adoptee’s inheritance rights depend on
the status of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in the jurisdiction, the age
limitations for inheritance in the jurisdiction, and whether there is any
language granting or restricting inheritance rights in the testamentary
documents. Some states, such as Minnesota, have a very favorable
policy toward adult adoptees and only restrict inheritance rights if the
testamentary document explicitly prohibits adult adoptees from
233
taking. In contrast, Wisconsin restricts the right of adult adoptees to
inherit from third parties, only allowing adoptees to inherit if they were
adopted before the age of eighteen or if they were raised in the
234
The majority of the
adoptor’s household before the age of fifteen.
time, the goal of the adoption is to make the adoptee a genuine member
of the family. As it stands, states do not uniformly treat adult adoptees
as genuine members of the family. A default rule that uniformly
recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights is generally in line with the
adoptor’s motivation for the adoption. Three proposals may help to
remedy this inconsistency: First, “family” should be defined by looking
at the functional role each member plays, as opposed to using marital
232. Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888, 890
(Minn. 1960).
233. See supra text accompanying note 184.
234. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010).
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status to define “family” and to determine the benefits that accompany
235
that status. Second, allowing a person to designate his or her heir is a
partial solution for partners that are prevented from adopting or for
partners who are discouraged from adopting by the awkward parent–
236
Third, a
child relationship that would result from the adoption.
uniform law that gives an adult adoptee the status of a natural child of
the adoptor, without any age limits, would ensure the equal treatment of
237
adult adoptees across the country.
JACKIE MESSLER *

235. See supra text accompanying notes 192–202.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 203–212.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 216–232.
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